安全港及安全船席（下）

楊仁壽

 

此外，船長根據這類條款通常使用的措辭，並不是非要將船舶駛入任何不安全港口或不安全船席。條款本身之目的就是為了免除他的此項義務。這類條款既然已被賦予這樣的涵義，那麼，又賦予該條款以完全不同的意義，而要求傭船人絕對承擔因船舶出事所遭受的損失，這種做法實屬無此必要。正如剛才所提及的那樣，在理解這類條款時，很容易與後一種涵義發生衝突，因為迫使船舶陷入危險之中，這絕不是傭船人所能行使的權力。如果傭船人根據條款規定，不能強制船舶進入不安全地點，那麼，也就很難把傭船人指定不安全港口說成是致使船舶進入不安全地點的原因（Further, the master, by the very words of the usual clauses, is not obligated to take his vessel to any unsafe port or berth. The very purpose of the clause is to free him of this obligation. Since these clauses can be and have been given this meaning, it is by no means necessary that they be given the quite different meaning of creating an affirmative liability of charterer to ship, in case of mishap. In deed, as just suggested, they might easily be read to contradiet this force the master to imperil the ship. It the charterer, by the clauses, is disabled from forcing the ship into an unsafe place, then his designation of an unsafe berth can hardly be said to cause the ships going there）。

最後，船舶可以投保，就所遭受的損壞可以從中得到補償（這一點與風險適當分配的計算有關）；然而，在實踐中幾乎每一案件，都會碰到賠付者，究竟是船舶保險人，或是傭船人的問題（Finally (and this cannot be irrelevant to an evaluation of the allocation of risk), the ship can and almost invariably does carry insurance covering damage to her; the realistic question, in nearly every case, is whether the ship’s hull underwrites of the charterer shall pay）。

因此，在船舶駛入不安全港口或船席的通常情況下，船長（根據以上討論的條款）可以正當拒絕進入這些港口或船席，但決定還得由船長作出（此為他的職責範圍），而且，隨後發生的損壞通常屬於船舶保險人承保的範圍，相對而言，傭船人對港口和船席的安全性一無所知，他對這種類型的責任並不一定予以投保，因此，除非事先有非常明確的文字規定，或發生令人信服的特殊情況，否則此項責任就不應轉嫁給傭船人（In the usual case of entry into an unsafe port or berth, therefore, the entry is effected by decision of the master (whose business it is to know) although (by operation of the very clauses under examination) he might validly have refused, and the ensuing damage is of a sort normally insured by the policy on hull. Very clear language, or compelling special circumstances, ought to be required, before the liability is shifted to the charterer, who may know nothing of the safety of ports and berths, and who is much less certain to be insured against this sort of liability）。

如上所述，這類條款中的文字欠明時，很容易被視為僅是對船舶所有人義務及傭船人相關權力的限制而已（As already suggested, this of language is missing in the clauses. They might easily be taken as no more than limits on the ship’s obligation and the charterer’s correlative power）。

不同案件有不同的情況。在確定某個港口是否不安全時，傭船人所知道的因素，卻不為船長所知或應該知道，這種情況雖然鮮少發生，但並不是不可能存在。對於某個特定船席的不安全情況，傭船人或受貨人或許對此瞭如指掌，而船長卻並不一定知道或沒有任何理由推定他應該知道，這種情況的發生也及有可能。在此情形下，傭船人或受貨人就可能要對該港口或船席的不安全承擔責任，但這並不是因為有了「安全港」或「安全船席」的條款規定，而是不論有無此條款，由於彼等事前不告知就讓船舶駛入彼等知曉的危險之中，這種錯誤業已構成提起訴訟的理由而須承擔責任。還有一種情況也應承擔責任，那就是傭船人或（更常見的是)受貨人所處地位，決定了彼等應合理承擔（特別是對於船席的）調查義務的情況（Special circumstances vary from case to case. It is possible, though most unlikely, that a charter will be aware of factors making a port unsafe, while the master will not have such knowledge, nor have any reason to have it. It is possible, and fairly likely, that the charterer or consignee may have knowledge of the conditions at a given berth which make it unsafe, while the master will neither have, nor reasonably be charged with having, such knowledge. In such cases, it may well be that the charterer or consignee ought to be held liable, not because of the “safe port” and “safe berth” clause, but because it ought to be held to be an actionable wrong for him to invite the ship without warning into a peril known to him, with or without the clauses. There may be cases, too, where the charterer or (more frequently) the consignee is so situated as reasonably to be charged with a duty of inquiry, particularly as to berth）。

如果沒有這些特殊因素，則無論是由於政策上的考慮，還是從字面上的解釋，均沒有任何理由根據安全港或安全船席條款，要求傭船人承擔因船舶遭到損壞的賠償責任。大約100多年以前，最高法院曾在某個案件中作出如此判決，其後，該法院對該案的判決既未推翻，也未作過任何變更。Atkins v. Fiber Co.一案是由地區法院（由著名的Benedict法官審理）審理過一件案件。在該案中，由於船舶駛入一個明顯不安全的港口，而導致船舶受到損壞（Absent such special factors, it is submitted that there is no reason, in policy or in interpretation, for holding the charterer liable for ship’s damage, on the basis of the safe port and safe-berth clauses. The Supreme Court seems as to have held, about a hundred years ago, in a case not since overruled or weakened in that Court. In Atkins v. Fiber Co., the district court (the illustrious Judge Benedict sitting), confronted with a claim for damages to her having entered a port concededly unsafe）。

法官認為：「船長是航海行家，熟悉並瞭解航程中所經過各個港口的水道，及船舶的載貨能力之人，應推定此為非船長莫屬，因此他所駕駛的船舶能否進入某一特定的港口，他是作出決策的人（the Court said: The master is the navigator, presumed to know best the channel of the ports within the natural range of the adventure, and the capacities of his vessel; and he is the proper person to determine whether his vessel can or cannot enter any particular port）。

在本案中，第2個港口是在船舶抵達京斯頓港後再指定的。船舶所有人並不打算去京斯頓港，因此，除了船長以外別無他人，船舶所有人的意圖必定是讓船長為其代表，處理第二港口被指定時有可能產生的，而且必須要在該港作出決定的問題（In the case the second port was to be designated at Kingston, where the owner did not intend to be except in the person of the master; and they must have intended that the master should act for them in determining the question which would arise when the second port should be designated, and must be there decided）。

如果認為指定的港口，對其船舶不安全，而且指定的港口並不屬於傭船契約所特別許可的範圍之內，則船長作為船舶所有人唯一的代表，有義務在當時就表明他的反對意見。如果沒有這樣做，則應視為他業已放棄了反對的權利。一旦條件被放棄，也就不復存在因違反此項條件而提起的訴訟（註10）（If then, the port named was deemed an unsafe port for his vessel, and so not within the privilege given by the charter, it was the duty of the master, as the sole representative of the owners, to have made known his objections at the time. Not having done so he must be deemed to have waived the right to object, and, the condition having been waived, no action can now be maintained for the breath of it）。」

隨後，該案又以另一項理由，提起了上訴，最高法院的判決意見，陳述了下列觀點（In its subsequent opinion, in an appeal taken on another ground, the Supreme Court said of the opinion in which these words occur）：

「經詳細審閱全部記錄，就本案的是非曲直而言，我們認為：地區法院審理此案時做出的判決，無可挑剔。現經充分討論，我們得出了與地區法院相同的判決結論，這些結論已在地區法院的判決中，表達得清楚無遺。現再次討論該結論進行論證，這樣的過程，與其說具有實質性的意義，倒不如說是只是一種形式而已（註11）（In regard to the merits－after a careful examination of the record－we have found no reason to dissent from the views of the learned district judge by whom the case was heard. However full might be our discussion, we should announce the same conclusions. They are clearly expressed and ably vindicated in his opinion. To so again through the process by which they reached would be a matter rather of form than substance）。

然而，隨後發生的某些案件卻表明，船舶因根據傭船人或受貨人的指示，進入不安全的地點而遭受損壞時，傭船人對此應負賠償責任（註12）。這些判例之所以作出如此判決，絕大多數甚至全部都是基於「特殊情況」的理由。但也有若干案件的判決使用了「擔保」一詞，不免走向極端，得出了與最高法院認可的Atkins一案完全不一致的判決結果（Nevertheless, some subsequent eases have intimated that the charterer is to be liable for damage resulting from entry into an unsafe place, on orders of charter or consignee. Most, perhaps all, of these cases could be explained on “special circumstance” grounds. But some have used the language of “warranty”, which, pushed to its extreme, would reach results quite in consistent with the language approved by the Supreme Court in the Atkins case）。

沒有任何理由要贊成這種趨勢的擴展，但願最高法院能有這麼一天遇上產生問題的案件，從而再次確認Atkins一案確定的原則，只有當傭船人明知或其特殊的行為足以構成或指控他的正當理由時，傭船人才應在此範圍內承擔責任（No reason supports this extension. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will one day take up a case raising this question, and reaffirm the principle of the Atkins decision, confining charterer’s liability to the case wherein his special knowledge or actions make it reasonable to charge him）。」

本文之所以長篇累贅，不厭其詳，將Gilmore & Black所著前揭書，有關「安全港」及「安全船席」的涵義及爭論的解決，細加敘述，不僅僅是彼等見解精闢，鞭辟入裡而已，而且幾乎全世界研究有關此部分的學者幾乎都奉此為圭臬，因而加以迻譯，以供國人參考。

誠然，在傭船人指定安全港口或安全船席後，在該等港口發生事故之原因時，如因船長的過失介入，遽然課以港船人負船舶損壞的賠償責任，未免不公。因之，傭船人如果能舉證證明船長輕率的依照傭船人的指示，以致船舶在傭船人所指示的港口或船席，招致船舶不當的危險時，就難課以傭船人所謂「違反指定安全港或安全船席的義務」（註13）。

而一向偏於船舶所有人利益的英國，迄今仍然未改其態度，認為遇到前述情形，既未減輕傭船人的責任，即於1945年所公布之「與有過失法」（Contributory Negligence），也認為無適用之餘地。不過，到了1974年似乎才認同美國Venore Transp. Co. v. Oswego Shipping Corp.一案的見解（註14），認為船長或海員有過失時，採了所謂因果關係中斷的理論，認為於此情形，傭船人全然不負責任，但有些法院仍有異說。

（全文完）

 

 

【註】

 

10. Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 2 Benedict, 381, 2 Fed. Cas, No. 601, at p.79。
11. Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co. (1873) 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) p.272, 299。
12. 參見Universal Tramp Shipping Co. v. Irish Salt Mining Co. (1970) A. M. C. 1783 (D. Mass 1970); Park S.S. Co. v. Cities Service Oil Co. (1951) 188 F. 2d 804, (1951) A.M.C. 851 (2d. Cir.); Cities Service Transportation Co. v. Gulf Oil Refining Co. (1513) 79 F. 2d 521, (1935) A.M.C. 1513 (2d. Cir. 1935); Easten Mass St. Ry Co. v. Transmarine Corp. (1930) 42 F. 2d. 58, A.M.C. 1454 (1 Cir. 1930)。
13. Venore Transp Co. v. Oswego Shipping Corp. 498 F. 2d 469, 1974 A.M.C. 827 (2d. Cir. 1974)。
14. (1974) 498 F. 2d 469, 1974 A.M.C. 827 (2d. Cir. 1974)。